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1.	Introduction	Jeff	 Speaks	 (2014)	 has	 recently	 defended	 the	 view	 that	 propositions	 are	 properties:	 the	proposition	 that	 grass	 is	 green	 is	 the	 property	 being	 such	 that	 grass	 is	 green,	 the	proposition	that	snow	is	white	 is	being	such	that	snow	is	white,	and	so	on.	We	argue	that	there	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 prefer	 Speaks’s	 theory	 to	 analogous	 but	 competing	 theories	 that	identify	 propositions	 with,	 say,	 2-adic	 or	 17-adic	 relations	 of	 the	 relevant	 sort,	 and	 we	conclude	 that	 none	 of	 these	 theories	 is	 true.	 This	 style	 of	 argument	 derives	 from	Benacerraf’s	(1965)	objection	to	the	view	that	numbers	are	sets,	and	it	has	been	deployed	by,	e.g.,	Bealer	(1993),	Moore	(1999),	Moltmann	(2013),	and	King	(2007)	as	an	objection	to	the	view	that	propositions	are	n-tuples,	 sets	of	worlds,	or	 functions	 from	worlds	 to	 truth	values,	and	by	Caplan	and	Tillman	(2013)	as	an	objection	to	King’s	view	that	propositions	are	facts	of	a	special	sort.1	2	We	offer	our	argument	as	an	objection	to	any	Speaks-style	view	according	to	which	propositions	are	unsaturated	(non-0-adic)	relations.		
																																								 																				1	 Moore	 (1999)	 claims	 that	 arbitrariness	 considerations	 count	 against	 every	 reductionist	 theory	 of	propositions,	but	he	gives	little	support	for	the	full	generalization,	which	is	too	strong	on	its	face.	One	might,	e.g.,	 have	 independent	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 obtaining	 and	 non-obtaining	 states	 of	 affairs	 are	 abundant,	hyperintensionally	individuated,	sui	generis	abstract	entities	(Plantinga	(1976)),	and	that	states	of	affairs	are	the	best	candidates	to	which	propositions	might	be	reduced.	If	one	then	decided	to	identify	propositions	with	states	of	affairs	(contra	Plantinga	(1976:	145)),	it	would	not	be	arbitrary	to	identify	the	proposition	that	grass	is	 green	 with	 grass’s	 being	 green,	 and	 so	 on	 (see	 Chisholm	 (1970)	 and	 Richard	 (2014)).	 So	 we	 hold	 that	reductionist	 theories	 of	 propositions	 should	 typically	 be	 evaluated	 individually,	 and	 that	 it	 often	 takes	detailed	investigation	to	find	out	whether	a	given	reduction	suffers	from	a	Benacerraf	problem.				
2	 Jubien	 (2001)	 argues	 that	 arbitrariness	 problems	 apply	 even	 to	 theories	 like	 those	 of	 King	 (2007),	 who	replies	 (2007:	 127-163),	 and	 Speaks	 (2014).	 As	 it	 applies	 to	 a	 Speaks-style	 theory,	 however,	 Jubien’s	argument	 depends	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 propositions	 are	 representational,	 which	 Speaks	 (2014:	 220)	denies.	Our	argument	makes	no	such	assumption.		
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2.	Speaks's	Theory	We	begin	by	comparing	Speaks’s	theory	to	a	more	familiar	view,	which	we	call	PPR:			 (1) propositions,	 properties,	 and	 relations	 are	 (a)	 abundant	 and	 (b)	hyperintensional:	there	are	necessarily	equivalent	propositions,	properties,	and	relations	that	are	not	identical;	(2) properties	are	1-adic	relations;	and	(3) propositions	are	0-adic	relations.	3		It	 is	notoriously	hard	to	give	a	precise	characterization	of	the	abundance	thesis,	(1a),	and	we	won’t	attempt	it.4	For	our	purposes	it	will	be	enough	to	note	that	if	(1a)	is	true,	then			 (1a*)	almost5	every	open	sentence	expresses	a	relation.6		Speaks	is	favorably	disposed	towards	(1)	and	(2),7	but	he	rejects	(3)	in	favor	of				 (4) 	Propositions	are	properties;	they	are	1-adic,	not	0-adic,	relations.			According	to	Speaks,	propositions	are	properties.	More	specifically:	(i)	not	every	property	is	a	proposition.	The	property	being	an	x	such	that	x	is	red	is	not	a	proposition;	nor	is	being	
an	x	such	that	x	is	identical	with	x.	But	(ii)	every	proposition	is	a	property.	The	proposition	
																																								 																				3	PPR	is	discussed	by	Quine	(1960:	165)	and	endorsed	by	Bealer	(1982:	1),	Zalta	(1983:	61),	Menzel	(1993),	van	 Inwagen	 (2004:	 131),	 and	Gilmore	 (2014).	 See	Dixon	 (Forthcoming:	 sect.	 4)	 for	 a	 development	 of	 the	analogies	between	properties,	relations,	and	instantiation,	on	the	one	hand,	and	propositions	and	truth	on	the	other.		4	See	Orilia	and	Swoyer	(2016:	sections	5.2	and	8).		5	We	say	‘almost	every’	to	avoid	saddling	PPRists	with	the	claim	that	‘x	does	not	instantiate	itself’	expresses	a	property.			6	We	assume	that	(i)	 if	an	open	sentence	contains	exactly	n	 free	variables	and	expresses	a	relation	of	some	fixed	adicity,	it	expresses	an	n-adic	relation	and	that	(ii)	necessarily,	no	relation	is	both	m-	and	n-adic,	where	m≠n	 This	 leaves	 open	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 some	 relations	 have	 no	 fixed	 adicity.	 On	 the	 incompatibility	 of	different	adicities,	see	Gilmore	(2013).				7	 Speaks	 needs	 abundant,	 hyperintensional	 properties,	 and	 it	 would	 be	 ad	 hoc	 not	 to	 endorse	 a	 parallel	account	of	other	relations.	Speaks	expresses	no	reservations	about	(1)	or	(2)	but	does	not	explicitly	endorse	them.	He	singles	out	van	Inwagen	(2004),	a	proponent	of	PPR,	as	providing	a	background	theory	of	properties	that	 meets	 his	 needs	 –	modulo	 van	 Inwagen’s	 commitment	 to	 (3).	 Regarding	 (3),	 Speaks	 writes,	 ‘I	 don’t	understand	what	a	0-place	property	could	be’	(2014:	90,	note	36).			
	 3	
that	snow	is	white	=	being	an	x	such	that	snow	is	white;	the	proposition	that	Obama	is	male	=	being	an	x	such	that	Obama	is	male;	and	so	on.	Can	we	explicate	the	‘and	so	on’?	It’s	not	clear	that	we	must	in	order	to	evaluate	the	theory.	Speaks	does	not	provide	a	fully	general,	precise	formulation	of	the	reductive	theory,	but	he	argues	for	it	nonetheless,	and	we	will	not	object	to	this	policy.	One	can	take	a	step	toward	increased	generality	by	noting	that	 if	Speaks’s	theory,	call	 it	T1,	 is	true,	then	so	is	the	following	meta-linguistic	thesis:						 M1	 Every	instance	of	schema	S1	is	true.		 	 S1	 the	proposition	that	ϕ	=	the	1-adic	relation	being	an	x	such	that	ϕ.		Granted,	 M1	 does	 not	 capture	 the	 full	 strength	 of	 T1,	 since	 it	 says	 nothing	 about	propositions	that	are	not	expressed	by	any	sentence	of	English.	But,	 in	practice,	everyone	who	endorses	M1	will	probably	also	endorse	T1.	So	M1	is	a	useful	proxy	for	T1.		Here	is	a	final	exegetical	point.	The	properties	to	which	Speaks	reduces	propositions	are	‘necessarily	all-or-nothing’	properties.	In	the	idiom	of	possible	worlds:	for	any	possible	world	w	and	any	proposition	p,	either	(i)	at	w,	everything	instantiates	p,	in	which	case	p	is	true	 at	 w	 or	 (ii)	 at	 w,	 nothing	 instantiates	 p,	 in	 which	 case	 p	 is	 false	 at	 w.	 The	 true	propositions	 at	 a	 world	 are	 the	 propositions	 that	 are	 instantiated	 by	 everything	 at	 that	world,	while	the	false	propositions	at	a	world	are	those	that	aren't	instantiated	by	anything	at	that	world.	But	some	necessarily	all-or-nothing	properties	–	e.g.,	being	self-identical	–	are	not	propositions	(Speaks	(2014:	90)).			
3.	The	Problem	For	each	proposition	p,	Speaks	finds	some	1-adic	relation	r1	and	claims	that	p	=	r1.	But	why	not	instead	find	some	2-adic	relation	r2	and	claim	that	p	=	r2?	Or	some	17-adic	relation	r17	and	claim	that	p	=	r17?	8	Let’s	 look	 at	 the	 case	 of	 2-adic	 relations.	 Let	 T2	 be	 the	 theory	 that	 identifies	propositions	with	certain	2-adic	relations	and	is	otherwise	parallel	to	T1.	According	to	T2,	
																																								 																				8	A	different	Benacerraf	problem	for	Speaks:	why	not	identify	the	proposition	that	grass	is	green	with	the	1-adic,	plural	property	being	some	xx	such	that	grass	is	green?	On	plural	properties,	see	Yi	(1999).	
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the	proposition	that	grass	is	green	=	the	2-adic	relation	being	an	x	and	a	y	such	that	grass	is	
green;	the	proposition	that	Obama	is	male	=	being	an	x	and	a	y	such	that	Obama	is	male;	and	so	on.	Like	T1,	T2	is	hard	to	state	precisely,	but	we	can	take	a	step	in	that	direction	with				M2	 Every	instance	of	schema	S2	is	true.	S2	 the	proposition	 that	ϕ	 =	 the	2-adic	 relation	being	an	 x	 and	a	 y	 such	
that	ϕ.		M2	fails	to	capture	the	full	strength	of	T2	for	the	same	reason	that	M1	fails	to	capture	the	full	 strength	 of	 T1.	 But	 both	meta-linguistic	 theses	 can	 serve	 as	 useful	 proxies	 for	 their	respective	theories.	The	relations	to	which	T2	reduces	propositions	are	necessarily	all-or-nothing	2-adic	relations:	each	such	relation	r2	is	such	that,	necessarily,	either	(i)	for	any	x	and	any	y,	r2	is	instantiated	by	x	and	y,	in	that	order,	or	(ii)	for	any	x	and	any	y,	r2	is	not	instantiated	by	x	and	 y,	 in	 that	 order.	 The	 true	 propositions	 at	 a	 world,	 according	 to	 this	 view,	 are	 the	propositions	that	everything	bears	to	everything	at	that	world,	while	the	false	propositions	are	those	that	nothing	bears	to	anything	at	that	world.	T2	says	that	all	propositions	are	2-adic,	 necessarily	 all-or-nothing	 relations,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 say	 that	 all	 such	 relations	 are	propositions.			 We	believe	that	the	case	to	be	made	for	T1	can	be	made	with	equal	plausibility	for	T2.	 For	 example,	 each	 theory	 identifies	 propositions	with	 entities	 in	which	we	 allegedly	have	 independent	 reason	 to	 believe.	 Speaks	 (2014:	 77,	 note	 12)	 assumes	 that	 we	 have	independent	 reason	 to	believe	 in	abundant,	hyperintensional	properties,	on	 the	model	of	van	 Inwagen	 (2004).	 If	he	 is	 right,	 then	presumably	we	also	have	 independent	 reason	 to	believe	in	abundant,	hyperintensional	2-adic	relations,	on	the	same	model.		Further,	 if	 one	 finds	 it	 antecedently	 plausible	 that	 the	 proposition	 that ϕ is	 a	structured	complex	having	certain	entities,	ee,	as	constituents,	then	for	any	positive	integer	n,	 one	 should	 also	 find	 it	 antecedently	plausible	 that	 the	n-adic	 relation	being	an	 x1	…	 xn	
such	that	ϕ	 is	a	similarly	structured	complex	having	ee	as	constituents.	So	neither	T1	nor	
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T2	 forces	 us	 to	 depart	much	 from	 antecedently	 plausible	 views	 (whatever	 they	may	 be)	about	the	constituents	and	internal	structure	of	propositions.9		Finally,	Speaks	says	that		 Propositions	 are	 properties	 which	 are	 true	 iff	 they	 are	 instantiated.	 Propositions	 are	 true	 with	respect	 to	a	world	w	 iff,	were	w	actual,	 that	property	would	be	 instantiated.	 .	 .	 .	Given	 this	view	of	truth	at	a	world,	thinking	of	propositions	as	properties	does	not	seem	to	require	any	serious	revision	in	 the	 way	 that	 we	 think	 about	 entailment	 relations	 between	 propositions,	 or	 semantics	 more	generally.	Propositions	are	necessary	iff	they	are	true	with	respect	to	every	possible	world;	 just	so,	on	the	present	account,	propositions	are	necessary	iff	the	properties	which	they	are,	are	instantiated	in	every	possible	world.	One	proposition	F	would	entail	another	proposition	G	iff	any	world	in	which	F	is	instantiated	is	also	a	world	in	which	G	is	instantiated	(2014:	76-77).		Likewise,	 T2	 does	 not	 demand	 much	 revision	 in	 our	 views	 about	 entailment	 between	propositions.	 It	 is	 also	 true	 according	 to	T2	 that	 “propositions	 are	 necessary	 iff	 they	 are	true	with	respect	to	every	possible	world".	According	to	T2,	propositions	are	necessary	iff	the	 relations	 which	 they	 are,	 are	 “born	 by	 everything	 to	 everything	 in	 every	 possible	world".	T2	also	guarantees	that	a	“proposition	F	would	entail	another	proposition	G	iff	any	world	in	which	[something	bears	F	to	something]	is	also	a	world	in	which	[something	bears	G	to	something]".	It	appears,	then,	that	T2	shares	these	crucial	virtues	with	T1.		In	addition,	it	seems	that	for	any	obvious	objection	one	might	raise	to	T2,	there	will	be	an	analogous	and	equally	forceful	objection	to	T1.		Two	examples	should	suffice	to	make	this	plausible.		First,	 T2	 faces	 a	 demarcation	 problem.	 Not	 all	 2-adic,	 necessarily	 all-or-nothing	relations	are	propositions.	For	example,	 the	relation	being	an	x	and	a	y	such	that	x=x	and	
y=y	is	not	a	proposition.	How,	then,	can	we	fill	in	the	blank	in	‘necessarily,	x	is	a	proposition	if	and	only	if	______’	so	as	to	make	the	resulting	sentence	both	true	and	informative?	Without	an	answer,	T2	may	seem	incomplete.	But	as	Speaks	points	out	(2014:	89	–	90),	T1	faces	an	analogous	demarcation	problem.	Any	solution	that	works	for	T1	should	have	an	analogue	that	works	for	T2.		 Second,	 given	 that	 the	 proposition	 that	 2>3	 and	 the	 proposition	 that	 1+1=5	 both	exist	and	are	not	identical,	T2	is	committed	to	the	existence	of	the	relations,	being	an	x	and	
a	y	such	that	2>3	and	being	an	x	and	a	y	such	that	1+1=5,	that	are	necessarily	uninstantiated	
																																								 																				9	Speaks	does	not	make	this	point,	but	we	assume	that	he	would	not	object.	
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and	 hyperintensionally	 individuated.	 But	 analogous	 points	 apply	 to	 T1.10	 Simply	 delete	each	occurrence	of	‘and	a	y’	in	the	italicized	expressions,	and	one	will	have	names	of	1-adic	relations	to	which	T1	is	committed	and	which	share	the	potentially	problematic	 features.	So	T2	is	no	worse	off	than	T1	in	these	respects.		
4.	Objections	and	Replies	
Objection	 1.	 What	 makes	 T1	 preferable	 to	 T2	 is	 that	 T1	 attributes	 a	 lesser	 adicity	 to	propositions	than	T2	does.	One	‘adicity	minimization’	principle	that	supports	this	claim	is:		 AMp	 Theories	 according	 to	which	 propositions	 are	m-adic	 should,	 pro	 tanto,	 be	preferred	 to	 theories	 according	 to	which	 propositions	 are	 n-adic,	 provided	that	m	is	a	positive	natural	number	less	than	n.		 					AMp	puts	T1	at	an	advantage	to	T2.	Adicity	aside,	T1	is	at	least	as	good	as	T2.	So,	given	AMp,	it	 follows	that	T1	 is	preferable	overall	 to	T2.	 In	support	of	AMp,	 (i)	 it	 is	 intuitive,	and	(ii)	considerations	of	simplicity	 favor	 it:	 theories	according	 to	which	propositions	are	m-adic	are	 pro	 tanto	 simpler	 than,	 hence	 pro	 tanto	 preferable	 to,	 theories	 according	 to	 which	propositions	are	n-adic,	where	m	is	a	positive	natural	number	less	than	n.		We	address	(i)	and	(ii)	separately.				 Reply	to	(i).	The	objector	takes	AMp	to	be	intuitive.	Perhaps	an	appeal	to	intuition	is	out	of	place	in	a	case	like	this,	 in	which	the	subject	matter	(the	adicity	of	propositions)	is	esoteric	 and	 theoretical.	 But	 suppose,	 with	 Speaks	 (2014:	 72),	 that	 intuition	 does	 carry	weight	even	on	such	topics.	Then	we	grant	that	some	principle	in	the	neighborhood	of	AMp	is	intuitive.	But	we	deny	that	AMp	itself	is	intuitive.		 Consider	three	theories.	The	first,	T0,	says	that	propositions	are	0-adic	relations,	in	accordance	with	component	(3)	of	PPR.	The	second,	T17,	says	that	propositions	are	17-adic	relations	 of	 the	 appropriate	 sort.	 The	 third,	 T19,	 says	 that	 propositions	 are	 19-adic	relations	 of	 that	 sort.	 How	 should	 we	 rank	 these	 theories?	 AMp	 is	 silent	 as	 to	 how	 T0	
																																								 																				10	On	necessarily	uninstantiated	properties,	see	(Speaks	2014:	77).	On	hyperintensional	properties,	see	(2014:	89).				
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compares	 to	 T17	 or	 T19,	 but	 it	 says	 that	 T17	 is	 preferable	 to	 T19.	 Both	 facts	 deserve	comment.			 First,	 it	 is	 plausible	 that,	 so	 far	 as	 considerations	 of	 adicity	 are	 concerned,	 T0	 is	preferable	 to	T17	or	T19.	 (More	on	 this	 below.)	 So	 if	AMp	 is	 intuitive,	 then	 so	 is	 a	more	general	principle,	call	it	AM,	which	results	from	deleting	the	word	‘positive’	in	AMp.	Second,	it	is	not	intuitive	that	T17	is	preferable	to	T19.	As	we	see	it,	intuition	is	either	agnostic	on	how	 to	 rank	 T17	 and	 T19,	 or	 else	 it	 ranks	 them	 as	 equal,	 and	 equally	 bad.	 This	weighs	against	the	intuitiveness	of	AMp	or	AM.		 If	any	principle	like	AMp	is	intuitive,	it	is	0-adicity	or	Bust:		 0B	 Theories	according	to	which	propositions	are	0-adic,	fully	saturated	entities	should,	pro	 tanto,	 be	preferred	 to	 theories	according	 to	which	propositions	are	not	fully	saturated	entities,	i.e.,	are	n-adic,	for	some	n>0.		0B	harmonizes	with	the	view	that	T0	is	preferable	to	T17	and	T19,	and	that	T17	and	T19	are,	if	anything,	equally	implausible.	Further,	lest	0B	be	thought	to	beg	the	question	against	Speaks,	we	can	argue	for	it	using	premises	acceptable	to	all	parties.11	Consider	these	four	expressions:		 (a)		 ___	is	farther	from	----	than	.	.	.	is	from	***	(b)	 ___	is	farther	from	----	than	.	.	.	is	from	South	Bend	(c)	 ___	is	farther	from	----	than	Princeton	is	from	South	Bend	(d)	 ___	is	farther	from	Delhi	than	Princeton	is	from	South	Bend		They	express	4-adic,	3-adic,	2-adic,	and	1-adic	relations,	respectively.	We	assume	that	this	is	granted	by	all	parties.	But	it	provides	inductive	evidence	that		 (e)	 Sacramento	is	farther	from	Delhi	than	Princeton	is	from	South	Bend		
																																								 																				11	Moreover,	 0B	 does	 not	 entail	 that	 T1	 is	 false,	 only	 that	 it	 has	 a	 vice.	 Speaks	 concedes	 that	 T1	 has	 vices	(2014:	78;	83,	note	24;	90,	note	36).	So	he	seems	amenable	in	principle	to	0B.	
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expresses	a	0-adic	relation.	All	parties	also	grant	that	(e)	expresses	a	proposition.	So,	unless	(e)	expresses	two	different	entities,12	 it	 follows	that	at	 least	some	propositions	are	0-adic	relations.	Considerations	of	uniformity	then	favor	the	idea	that	all	propositions	are	0-adic	relations.	Call	 this	 the	plugging	argument.	Speaks	may	 find	some	step	 in	 the	argument	 to	resist,	 but	 only,	we	 think,	 at	 some	 cost.	What	 the	 argument	 shows,	 then,	 is	 that	 there	 is	theoretical	pressure	toward	0B.			 Might	one	hold,	with	AM,	that	while	it	would	be	ideal	to	treat	propositions	as	0-adic,	it	would	still	be	better	to	treat	them	as	1-adic	than	as	2-adic	or	17-adic?	This	position	is	just	as	unintuitive	as	 the	analogous	view	 that	 theories	according	 to	which	horses	have	n	 legs	are	pro	tanto	preferable	to	theories	according	to	which	horses	have	m	legs,	provided	that	|4	–	n|	is	less	than	|4	–	m|.		The	fact	that	17	is	closer	to	4	than	19	is	doesn’t	make	the	view	that	horses	have	17	legs	pro	tanto	preferable	to	the	view	that	horses	have	19	legs.	We	conclude	that	it	is	0B,	not	AM	or	AMp,	that	is	intuitive	in	its	own	right	and	supported	by	nearby	data	(via	 the	 plugging	 argument).	 And	 rather	 than	 breaking	 the	 tie	 between	 T2	 and	 T1,	 0B	merely	puts	both	at	a	disadvantage	to	T0.			 Reply	to	(ii).	The	objector	claims	that	T1	is	simpler	than	T2.	There	are	several	things	one	might	mean	by	this.		(a)	One	might	mean	that	T1	is	more	ontologically	parsimonious	than	T2,	i.e.,	that	T1	posits	 fewer	 entities	 (or	 types	 of	 entity)	 than	 T2.	 But	 that	 is	 false.	 Strictly	 speaking,	 T2	posits	the	2-adic	relations	that	it	 identifies	with	propositions,	and	nothing	else,	 just	as	T1	posits	 the	1-adic	relations	 that	 it	 identifies	with	propositions,	and	nothing	else.13	So	both	are	committed	to	an	abundance	of	entities	of	a	single	type.	Granted,	T2	is	plausible	only	to	the	extent	that	there	is	independent	reason	to	believe	in	the	2-adic	relations	it	posits;	and	any	such	reason	will	 also	 support	 the	1-adic	 relations	posited	by	T1.	But	 the	converse	 is	equally	 true.	 T1	 is	 plausible	 only	 to	 those	 who	 would	 have	 embraced	 an	 extreme	abundance	of	hyperintensional	1-adic	relations	anyway,	even	if	these	relations	hadn’t	been	
																																								 																				12	 If	 a	 0-adic	 relation	 is	 expressed	 by	 (e),	 then,	 just	 as	 the	 1-adic	 relation	 expressed	 by	 (d)	 is	 true	 of	Sacramento,	the	0-adic	relation	expressed	by	(e)	is	true	simpliciter,	which	suggests	that	it	is	a	proposition.		13	Given	 that	T2	entails	 that	 the	2-adic	 relation	being	an	x	and	a	y	 such	 that	grass	 is	green	 exists,	doesn’t	 it	follow	that	T2	also	entails	that	the	property	being	an	x	such	that	grass	is	green	exists	and	is	1-adic?	We	doubt	it.	 One	might	 reduce	 propositions	 to	 2-adic	 relations	 via	 T2	 and	 reduce	 properties	 to	 2-adic	 relations,	 by	saying	that	the	property	being	an	x	such	that	x	is	red	=	being	a	y	and	an	x	such	that	x	is	red,	and	so	on.	On	this	(odd)	view,	propositions	and	properties	are	2-adic	relations	of	different	sorts.	
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used	in	a	reductive	theory	of	propositions.	But,	to	our	knowledge,	no	one	has	ever	held	that	there	are	1-adic	relations	such	as	being	an	x	such	that	Obama	is	male	but	no	2-adic	relations	such	as	being	an	x	and	a	y	such	that	Obama	is	male.	Such	a	view	would	be	highly	ad	hoc.	So	T1	and	T2	are	committed	to	the	same	number	of	entities	and	to	the	same	number	of	 types	of	entities.	And	 for	either	 theory	 to	be	 remotely	plausible,	 the	same	background	ontology	of	properties	and	relations	is	required.		(b)	One	might	instead	mean	that	T1	is	more	ideologically	parsimonious	than	T2,	i.e.,	that	T2	 invokes	more	bits	of	primitive	 ideology	 than	T1.	This	 is	also	doubtful.	What	new	primitive	 ideology	must	T2	use	 over	 and	 above	 that	 used	by	T1?	Both	 employ	 the	 same	term-forming	 operator	 ‘being	 an	 x1	 …	 xn	 such	 that	ϕ ’.	 The	 mere	 fact	 that	 T2	 uses	 two	variables	 where	 T1	 uses	 only	 one	 makes	 no	 difference	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 primitive	ideological	machinery	of	the	two	theories.	And	even	if	it	did,	the	T1-ist	will	have	to	employ	two	variables	when	forming	terms	that	refer	to	2-adic	relations.		It’s	just	that,	on	T1,	none	of	these	relations	will	be	propositions.	(c)	 Finally,	 one	might	mean	 that	T1	 is	 shorter	 than	T2.	Consider	 some	 instance	of	schema	S1	(e.g.,	 ‘the	proposition	that	grass	is	green	=	being	an	x	such	that	grass	is	green’)	and	the	corresponding	instance	of	schema	S2	(‘the	proposition	that	grass	is	green	=	being	
an	 x	 and	 a	 y	 such	 that	 grass	 is	 green’).	 The	 former	 sentence	 is	 shorter	 than	 the	 latter.	Further,	consider	the	definitions	of	truth	at	a	world,	and	of	entailment,	associated	with	T1.	These	are	shorter	than	the	corresponding	definitions	associated	with	T2.			We	grant	 all	 this.	But	 this	 sort	of	brevity	 is	not	often	 cited	as	 a	 theoretical	 virtue.	Moreover,	 if	 it	were	such	a	virtue,	Benacerraf’s	original	problem	would	not	have	had	 the	impact	 it	did.	Benacerraf	 argued	 that	 there	 is	no	 reason	 to	 identify	 the	ordinals	with	 the	von	Neumann	ordinals	rather	than	the	Zermelo	ordinals.	Yet,	the	Zermelo	definitions	of	the	numbers	(and	any	definitions	given	in	terms	of	them)	are	shorter	than	the	corresponding	von	Neumann	definitions.	To	look	at	a	representative	example,	the	competing	definitions	of	the	number	two	are:		Zermelo:	 	 2	=	{{∅}}	von	Neumann:	 2	=	{∅,	{∅}}	
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	According	 to	 the	 Zermelo	 definition,	 2	 has	 only	 one	 member,	 which	 is	 {∅};	 whereas,	according	 the	 von	 Neumann	 definition,	 2	 has	 two	 members,	 {∅}	 and	∅.	 	 This	 makes	 it	plausible	 that	 the	 Zermelo	 theory	 is	 shorter	 than	 the	 von	Neumann	 theory,	 in	whatever	sense	 T1	 is	 shorter	 than	 T2.	 But,	 to	 our	 knowledge,	 this	 has	 never	 been	 seriously	considered	as	a	way	to	solve	the	Benacerraf	problem.		This,	we	think,	is	because	brevity	of	this	sort	should	not	play	a	significant	role	in	theory	choice.	Accordingly,	it	cannot	solve	our	problem	for	Speaks’s	theory.14		 Objection	2.	According	 to	T1,	 the	proposition	 that	grass	 is	green	=	 being	an	x	 such	
that	grass	is	green.	According	to	T2,	that	proposition	=	being	an	x	and	a	y	such	that	grass	is	
green.	 Thus,	 T2	 posits	 an	 additional	 argument	 place	 in	 the	 given	 proposition.	Moreover,	that	 additional	 argument	 place	 does	 no	 work:	 it	 brings	 no	 advantages	 beyond	 those	associated	with	the	single	argument	place	posited	by	T1.	Since	every	such	argument	place	is	a	cost,	T2	is	costlier	all	things	considered	than	T1.			 Reply.	 We	 want	 to	 make	 two	 points.	 (i)	 Neither	 T1	 nor	 T2	 is	 stated	 in	 terms	 of	argument	places.	As	far	as	T1	or	T2	go,	one	is	free	to	deny	that	there	are	argument	places.	One	 is	 free,	 e.g.,	 to	 say	 that	 loving	 is	 2-adic	 but	 has	 no	 argument	 places.	 (Though	 see	Gilmore:	2013	for	critical	discussion	of	various	‘slot-free’	treatments	of	adicity.)		 In	 response,	 the	 objector	 might	 restate	 Objection	 2	 as	 follows:	 ‘T2	 increases	 the	adicity	of	propositions,	 in	 comparison	 to	T1,	without	yielding	any	 corresponding	benefit.	Since	theories	according	to	which	propositions	are	m-adic	should,	pro	tanto,	be	preferred	to	theories	according	to	which	propositions	are	n-adic,	provided	that	m	is	a	positive	natural	number	 less	 than	n,	T1	 is	preferable	overall	 to	T2.’	But	 this	 is	 just	Objection	1,	which	we	have	already	addressed.		 (ii)	Even	if	T1	and	T2	were	both	committed	to	argument	places,	Objection	2	would	still	 fail,	 for	 familiar	 reasons.	 Each	 theory	 is	 plausible	 only	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	
																																								 																				
14	A	fourth	version	of	the	simplicity	objection	is	that	T1	is	preferable	to	T2	because	T1	identifies	propositions	with	entities	that	have	a	 lower	adicity,	and	hence	are	simpler,	than	those	associated	with	T2.	We	reply,	first,	that	argument	is	needed	for	the	claim	that	lower	adicity	entities	are,	ceteris	paribus,	simpler	entities	in	some	sense	relevant	to	theory	choice.	(If	n	has	fewer	prime	factors	than	m,	does	that	contribute	to	n’s	being	simpler	than	m?)	Second,	an	analogous	simplicity	objection	applies	just	as	forcefully	to	Benacerraf’s	original	problem	about	numbers	and	sets,	so	our	new	problem	for	Speaks	is,	at	worst,	on	par	with	the	original.		
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abundant	realism	about	n-adic	relations,	for	each	positive	natural	number	n.	Together	with	this	backdrop,	T1	is	committed	to	the	same	number	of	argument	places	as	is	T2.	True,	the	relations	 that	 T1	 calls	 propositions	 have	 fewer	 argument	 places	 in	 them	 than	 do	 the	relations	that	T2	calls	propositions,	but	both	overall	packages	have	the	same	ontology.	So	the	‘additional’	argument	places	posited	by	T2	are	not	‘additional’	in	any	sense	that	harms	T2	 vis-à-vis	 T1.	 (Moreover,	 the	 finite	 Zermelo	 ordinals	 have	 fewer	 members	 than	 the	corresponding	 finite	 von	 Neumann	 ordinals,	 but	 this	 doesn’t	 solve	 Benacerraf’s	 original	problem.)			 	
5.	Conclusion	We	 have	 argued	 that	 there	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 prefer	 Speaks's	 reductionist	 theory	 of	propositions,	according	to	which	propositions	are	properties,	to	certain	other	reductionist	theories,	according	to	which	propositions	are	n-adic	relations,	for	n>1.	We	have	shown	that	the	virtues	that	Speaks	attributes	to	his	own	theory	are	shared	by	the	alternative	theories,	and	 that	 the	 potential	 vices	 of	 the	 alternative	 theories	 have	 analogues	 that	 afflict	 that	Speaks’s	 theory.	 We	 conclude,	 in	 the	 manner	 of	 Benacerraf	 (1965),	 that	 none	 of	 these	reductionist	theories	is	true.15		 	
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